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Discrimination, Othering, and the Political
Instrumentalizing of Pandemic Disease
Two Case Studies
Martina Baradel, Emanuele Costa *
The complex history of pandemics has created a diversified array of anti-epidemic
responses, which have allowed structures of authority to express their power in
multiple ways. In this paper, by considering theories applicable to cases ranging
from Europe to Asia, from the 11tʰ to the 18tʰ century, we conduct a compara-
tive analysis capable of identifying common traits and radical differences, aiming
to show how such deployment of power was not always commensurate with the
medical theories of the age, and with the gravity of the epidemiological situation.
Specifically, we analyse how Western European States, in their process of forma-
tion, employed the concept of ‘public health’ to create the grounds for an unprece-
dented exercise of power over the private sphere. Furthermore, we compare this
attitude with the discrimination of the minority known as burakumin in Japan,
which was destined to undertake any ‘dirty’ or ‘impure’ occupation, to preserve the
immunity of the community. In other words, we examine how structures of power
have exploited states of exception to implement control measures beyond the needs
of the situation through an increasingly hypertrophic apparatus of security; and
ways in which political authorities have not aligned with medical or philosophical
authorities of their times, for opportunistic reasons that benefited their own social,
religious, or racial group.
*Birkbeck College, University of London (martina.baradel @ gmail.com); Visiting Scholar, Van-
derbilt University (emanuelecosta108 @ gmail.com).
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1. Introduction
Scholarship surrounding pandemic diseases has often reflected upon the lega-
cy of socio-political changes, triggered by outbreaks of contagious illnesses.
However, many of these scholars examined pandemics that had spread through
past societies. Thus, they were able to assess the effects of the disease in ret-
rospective. In 2020, we face a most unique opportunity, as for the first time
in contemporary history a pandemic has halted the movements of people and
goods on a global scale. Pandemics and endemic disease have affected differ-
ent areas of the world at different times, having severe repercussions on local
communities and economies. The scale of Covid-19 is such that, as scholars, we
are forced to consider the repercussions of pandemics while experiencing one.
At this junction, it is thus even more appropriate to analyse the socio-political
impact of pandemics.
In this paper, we analyse the evolution of the political measures which so-
cieties around the globe implemented to respond to pandemic diseases. This
analysis will utilize a critical theoretical lens, which we describe in Section 2, to
construct a conceptual framework. Such a framework is necessary to examine
profoundly diverse (in historical and geopolitical terms) case studies. In fact, the
two cases we shall discuss range from Western Europe to Japan (respectively,
in Sections 4 and 3). We shall begin our analysis from the Middle Ages and wit-
ness the development of “public health” paradigms throughout the Renaissance
and the Early Modern period.
The theoretical lens established in Section 2 shall allow us to develop a social
and critical analysis based on the insurgence of paradigms of segregation, seg-
mentation, and exclusion, aiming at the creation of an immune society. How-
ever, as we shall demonstrate, ‘immunity’ is a politically charged term, as it
often requires the othering and exclusion of minorities and/or discriminated
social groups. In the current crisis, generated by the outbreak of the Covid-19
pandemic, the concern for potentially exclusive and discriminatory practices is
warranted by aworrying pattern of behaviours. Such behaviours include attacks
against Asian minorities, higher risk of infection and medical complication for
disadvantaged communities, and an intensification of biopolitical surveillance
towards foreign individuals and ‘strangers’.
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In our paper, we shall demonstrate how these patterns are dangerously well-
established in the history of political authority, and how the response to epi-
demic disease has often been hijacked for political purposes. Generated either
through the conscious actions of the established structures of power, or through
socially dangerous behaviours, these actions carry the risk of defending an
imagined “immunity” at the expense of discriminated minorities.
2. Theoretical Framework
In this section, we explore the theoretical implications of the historical mea-
sures deployed to tackle the insurgence of pandemics in a variety of geopoliti-
cal circumstances. We shall consider theories applicable to cases ranging from
Western Europe to East Asia, from the 11ᵗʰ to the 18ᵗʰ century, with the aim of
a comparative analysis capable of identifying common traits and radical differ-
ences.The range of these measures, often utilizing discrimination as a key com-
ponent of their structural response, includes segregation, segmentation, and
immunity. The theoretical outline developed in this section will be applied to
the analysis of our case studies, in Sections 3 and 4.
As contemporary understanding of epidemics and disease outbreaks teaches
us, containing the spreading of the infection is at the forefront of response
strategies for most institutionalized structures of power. However, the social
construction of the experience of disease plays a fundamental role in dictating
which measures are available for implementing containing strategies. Contem-
porary epidemiology and medicine have revealed how microorganisms such as
bacteria and viruses are responsible for human diseases, including epidemic dis-
eases. Yet, the range of explanations provided by ancient, medieval, and Early
Modern medicine and natural philosophy to explain the outbreak of diseases
ranged much further and wider. It encompassed various theories regarding the
nature of illnesses, their means of propagation, and the efficacy of countermea-
sures to contain contagions and to reduce death tolls.
The complex history of disease ætiology (i.e. the inquiry into the causes of an
illness and its spreading) created a diversified array of anti-epidemic responses,
which allowed structures of authority to deploy their power in multiple ways.
In this paper, we aim to show how such deployment of power was not always
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commensurate with the medical theories of the age, and with the gravity of
the epidemiological situation. In other words, we shall examine how structures
of power have exploited a frenzied and scared population to implement con-
trol measures beyond the needs of the situation; and ways in which political
authorities have not aligned with medical or philosophical authorities of their
times, for opportunistic reasons that benefited their own social, religious, or
racial group.
During the development of epidemiology and disease aetiology, the concepts
of ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ recurred at an obsessive rate, motivating the segrega-
tion and discrimination of the ‘unhealthy’. In this paper, we explicitly focus on
how social and political factors influenced the construction of these categories.
The process of ‘othering’—as we shall show in both our case studies, regard-
ing Early Modern Europe and Japan—was at the center of most epidemiological
responses. The rationale of such process was the identification of disease ‘car-
riers’ or ideological causes, resulting in isolation, discrimination, and punitive
action. Thus, authorities directed their energy against the groups who were
perceived as responsible either for the creation or the transmission of a dis-
ease. As Snowden points out, during the waves of plague that disfigured Europe
throughout the late medieval and Early Modern ages, “authorities took action
although there was no medical understanding of the mechanisms governing
the disease they were facing”.¹ Structures of power often seconded popular be-
liefs, enabling discriminatory behaviours rooted in non-medical notions of sin,
punishment, and purity. As Mary Watson establishes, “where the social sys-
tem explicitly recognises positions of authority, those holding such positions
are endowed with explicit spiritual power, controlled, conscious, external and
approved—powers to bless or curse”.²
Historically, then, ‘purity’ became an ideal to be preserved at all costs, in
order to protect ‘respectable’ citizens from the consequences of ‘impure’ be-
haviours. Epidemics provided the practical grounds for a theoretical answer,
expressed in what we may call a permanent state of exception.³ In turn, this
¹Frank M. Snowden, Epidemics and Society: From the Black Death to the Present (New Haven,
CT: Yale UP, 2019), 69.
²Mary Watson, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London:
Routledge, 1984), 100.
³Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. D. Heller-Roazen (Stan-
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state of exception is embodied through practices of biopolitical surveillance
and suspension of civic rights (which we will address below), isolation, seclu-
sion, othering, and finally, outbursts of physical violence. It is not a coincidence
that during the exceptional circumstances created by epidemics, people who
were subject to regulation by structures of power often (if not always) hap-
pened to belong to social groups already at the outskirts of full political life.
In Early Modern Europe, as demonstrated in Section 4, this applied to beggars,
‘poors’ (as described by various iterations of Venetian laws), prostitutes, Jews,
and other ‘undesirables’. In medieval Japan,¹ as we shall see in Section 3, the
same strategy specifically applied to the population known as burakumin, an
occupational minority that included those who worked with impurity (death
and dirt), destined to bear the social and physical risk of infection.
In this sense, it is worth noting that—at least in Europe—the development of
biopolitical containment measures for epidemic diseases coincided with the es-
tablishment of stronger political authorities. In particular, the strictness and
level of organization of these measures augmented proportionally with the
birth of national States.² During the late medieval times and the Renaissance,
even radical political theorists such as Machiavelli would not have formulated
as strong a response to epidemics as the ones developed, almost casually, by
stronger structures of power at the peak of the Modern era. In fact, Italian me-
dieval and Renaissance intellectuals such as Boccaccio and Machiavelli often
lamented the loss of decency and social structure brought about by the plague
and the panic that ensued.³ However, few (if any) intellectuals and political the-
orists of their times outright demanded a higher control by the authorities. The
lack of expectations towards the body politic and the established power struc-
tures can be seen as a consequence of the underestimation of public health in
Europe, until the establishment of the Venetian Boards of Health (as we shall
ford, CA: Stanford UP, 1998), 90.
¹Medieval Japan can be defined to start in 1185 with the Kamakura period. The advent of the
Tokugawa period in 1603 marked the beginning of Early Modern Japan.
²Cf. Snowden, Epidemics and Society, 69.
³Cf. Giovanni Boccaccio, The Decameron, trans. J. Payne (New York: Modern Library, 1955), 11-
12; William J. Landon, Lorenzo di Filippo Strozzi and Niccolò Machiavelli: Patron, Client, and the
Pistola fatta per la peste / An Epistle Written Concerning the Plague (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2013), 187.
Discrimination, Othering, and the Political Instrumentalizing of Pandemic Disease 3 : 5
see in Section 4). Further evidence for this reasoning might be provided by the
observation of the Japanese case, in which the transition from regional author-
ities to a strong centralized state similarly resulted in an organized biopolitical
response to the risk of infection (see Section 3).
Therefore, we may infer that the very conceptual possibility of biopolitical
control is dependent upon the existence—or the creation—of a unified structure
of power capable of implementing it. By contrast, once the national State is es-
tablished, the threat to public health is perceived as a security problem, to be
addressed in terms of confinement, separation, and exclusion.¹ Infected individ-
uals become the ‘others’. Thus, the established authorities see it as their duty—
and their right—to exercise a high level of biopolitical control over the infected
in order to preserve the ‘healthy’. Of course, the drawing of such boundaries,
which is political in nature, runs along familiar lines of oppression and social
discrimination, since they overlap with the ideological borders that regulate the
circulation of individuals within a biopolitical context.²
The institution of pesthouses (confinement buildings or hospitals destined
to host patients suffering from the plague) in Early Modern Europe, for exam-
ple, served both as a sanitary device and as an embodiment of political control
enforced by fear. Being sentenced to isolation in a pesthouse separated an in-
dividual from the body politic, suspending their political rights, and—due to
the exorbitant costs charged to the few survivors—effectively destroying their
economic stability. Moreover, such internments “carried a dishonouring stigma
because [pesthouses] were used as places of punishment where the authorities
relegated those whom they regarded as noncompliant with their regulations”.³
The psychosocial effects of biopolitical control thus matched preventive ‘scare
tactics’ with the theoretical possibility of discerning between healthy and un-
healthy, pure and impure.
While biopolitical control was enforced by civil authorities, a consistent share
of the ideological framework that allowed such control was provided by reli-
gious authorities. The very idea of ‘purity’ is highly influenced by ideological
¹Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-78, ed. M.
Senellart, trans. G. Burchell (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1-2.
²Cf. Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero, “Biopolitics of Security in the 21ˢᵗ Century: An
Introduction”, Review of International Studies 34 (2008): 268.
³Snowden, Epidemics and Society, 74.
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and religious factors. As we shall show in both of our case studies—such factors
shaped the way in which contagion, and the response to contagion, was to be
intended. Just to provide a noteworthy example, we may consider the fact that
in the early Muslim world, far from identifying the unhealthy with sinners, be-
coming a victim of the plague was equated with martyrdom. Scholars explain
the striking difference between this Islamic conception and the Western Euro-
pean interpretation of the plague as God’s punishment by appealing to histori-
cal circumstances. In fact, troops who were undertaking jihād to spread Islamic
rule experienced the first pandemic in Syria in the 7ᵗʰ century. Thus, religious
authorities attributed a sanctifying effect to dying on behalf of the community—
and its expansion according to the will of the Prophet—at the hands of the
plague.¹ The conceptualization of plague as a divine punishment for sin, then,
is patently a result of social religious construction, which applied unevenly de-
pending on the political circumstances that engendered and accompanied such
construction. However, this is not an exclusively Christian or European oc-
currence. As we shall emphasize in Section 3 of this paper, Shintoism and its
insistence on the concept of ‘purity’ played a fundamental role in the social
construction of the barrier between healthy and unhealthy. In turn, this sanc-
tioned the ostracization of burakumin, as they represented the embodiment of
uncleanness.²
In Birth of the Clinic, Foucault discusses the evolution of the concept of dis-
ease and diseased body. He argues that “the exact superposition of the ‘body’ of
disease and the body of the sickman is no more than a historical, temporary da-
tum”.³ Thus, the clinic is an institutional space that has been differently utilized
throughout history according to shifting medical paradigms. In this sense, un-
til the 18ᵗʰ century the disease was understood to be spread uniformly within
the bodily boundaries of the patient. However, with the introduction of new
tests and techniques of examination, the disease began to be located only in
certain specific parts of the sick body. In particular, Foucault argues that the lat-
ter conceptualization of the disease emerged after the alliance of medicine and
¹Justin Stearns, “NewDirections in the Study of Religious Responses to the BlackDeath”,History
Compass 7 (2009): 1366.
²June A. Gordon, “Caste in Japan: The Burakumin”, in Biography 40 (2017): 269.
³Michel Foucault,The Birth of the Clinic. An Archaeology of Medical Perception, trans. Alan Sheri-
dan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973; Taylor& Francis e-Library, 2003), 3.
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the State. Thus, truth/knowledge and power are mutually constitutive.¹ In this
sense, illnesses cannot only be understood as an epidemiologic phenomenon
that prompts a limited response from a local or national government, which
acts in order to suppress the infection.
Diseases succeed one another as secular fears, stimulating reactions tending
to separation, exclusion, and purification.² For instance, the rituals that emerged
in Early Modern Europe around leprosy—i.e., the creation of lazarettos or iso-
lation hospitals destined to host incurable patients—were not directly aimed at
suppressing it, but rather to keep it at a consecrated distance. Nevertheless, even
when leprosy disappeared from the continent, the set of values and images that
became intertwined with lepers, the meaning of their exclusion from the com-
munity, remained.³ In the same way, the rituals of exclusion that determined
the segregated life of the buraku community from Japanese society persists to
the present day, as they acquired a further significance that went beyond the
exclusion of the buraku from the community for sanitary reasons. In the same
way, the consequences of the regulation and ‘othering’ of undesirable subjects
(beggars, “poors”, prostitutes, Jews) lasted for much longer than the epidemics
during which these regulations were deployed.
However, during the history of the management of disease, the strategies
used to deploy power shifted from segregation to segmentation.⁴ While leprosy
bequeathed to the community rituals of exclusion and segregation between two
sets of people (emphasizing once more the dichotomy between pure and im-
pure), the plague brought about multiple separations enforced by a system of
surveillance, control, and, in general, intensification of power. Thus, while the
political ideal pursued with leprosy was that of a “pure community”, the project
pursued during the plague is that of a disciplined society,⁵ obtained through po-
litical segmentation, rather than segregation.
The centrality of the body as the object of biopolitics continued to be a central
tenet of the studies on the body and its role in relation to power, but the intro-
¹Ian Anderson, “Bodies, Disease, and the Problem of Foucault”, The International Journal of An-
thropology 37 (1995): 69.
²Michel Foucault, History of Madness, ed. J. Khalfa (New York: Routledge, 2006), 8.
³Foucault, History of Madness, 6.
⁴Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 1995), 200.
⁵Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 198.
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duction of new technologies shifted the understanding of the body towards its
fragmentation. As in the 18ᵗʰ century the discovery of new medical notions and
examination techniques led to a new form of biopower, one that determined
a new spatialization of the disease (from being homologous to being located
only in restricted areas of the patient’s body), the discovery of the immune sys-
tem, can be argued, led to a new step in the deployment of power that could
finally manifest itself through hypertrophic apparatuses of security. Indeed, if
the realms of medicine—and in particular disease—and society—and in particu-
lar its control—merge in the field of biopolitics, the immune system is that ap-
paratus that aims at safeguarding the body/society from the disease. In Donna
Haraway’s words, “the immune system is a plan for meaningful action to con-
struct and maintain the boundaries for what may count as self and other in the
crucial realms of the normal and the pathological”.¹ In this sense, the immune
system confers a further significance to biopolitics as it was hitherto under-
stood. Politics and life, power and body, are not connected by an immediate
relationship anymore: the apparatuses that protect the body (i.e. the immune
system, or those devices that are used for the protection of the body) mediate
the relationship.
The immunitas (immunity) that is the aim of the government’s action in face
of an epidemic is a central concept in exploring the socio-political measures
deployed by governments to keep the community safe. In Roberto Esposito’s
view, immunity is a comparative and dialectical concept.² It represents the state
of diversity compared to the condition of others (as carriers), rather than the
exemption from the condition. However, this state of diversity, insofar as it
establishes identity through a process of differentiation from another which is
only contingently ‘other’, carries the germ of its own dissolution.³
In particular, between the 18ᵗʰ and 19ᵗʰ century, with the birth of medical bac-
teriology, the idea that a small amount of infection can protect from the disease
itself came forward, suggesting a new ‘preventive’ logic. Under this paradigm,
¹Donna Haraway, “The Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies: Determinations of Self in Immune
Discourse System”, in Feminist Theory and the Body, ed. J. Price and M. Shildrick (New York: Rout-
ledge, 1999), 204
²Roberto Esposito, Immunitas. The Protection and Negation of Life (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2011), 8.
³We are grateful to an anonymous referee from this Journal for this point.
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the disease is to be contrasted by including it within the boundaries of the or-
ganism, rather than excluding it completely. The idea translated in the social
sphere through the concept that a minority contradicting the rule of the com-
munity with its presence within the city reproduces in a controlled way the evil
from which the community needs to protect itself from.
According to Esposito, all communities have some sort of immune system,
embodied through biopolitical surveillance, and this is a further proof of the in-
separability of community and immunity.¹ Similarly, Peter Sloterdijk posits that
“immune dispositifs are what enables systems to become systems, forms to be-
come forms, and cultures to become cultures in the first place”.² The similitude
between the social organism and the biological form is such that through the
establishment of an immunitary boundary communities “ascend to the level of
self-organizing unities, preserving and reproducing themselves with constant
reference to a potentially and actually invasive and irritating environment”.³
The dialectic of segregation between internal and external, pure and impure,
healthy and unhealthy, lies therefore at the very heart of the social establish-
ment.
These dynamics could be observed in the recent outbreak of Covid-19, in
which unprecedented strategies of security and surveillance were deployed to
control the population, based on the attention for the boundaries and the fear
of contagion by strangers, and the consequent installation of defensive barriers.
These strategies are part of the discourses on the immune system, which since
the beginning assumed militaristic connotations of ‘defence’. Indeed, the fear
of contagion by the ‘stranger’ or the ‘foreigner’ (in this case usually embodied
by someone with Asian traits) was a predominant theme during the Covid-19
pandemic and escalated into racist attacks against Asian communities in many
Western countries.⁴ At the same time, these events can also be framed as the
identification of disease carriers that are isolated and discriminated against.
Moreover, the attention to both geographic and bodily boundaries has been
particularly heightened during the Covid-19 pandemic. First, we witnessed the
¹Esposito, Immunitas, 18.
²Peter Sloterdijk, You Must Change Your Life, trans. W. Hoban (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), 7.
³Sloterdijk, 7.
⁴Suyin Haynes, “As Coronavirus Spreads, So Does Xenophobia and Anti-Asian Racism”, Time,
March 6, 2020.
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closing of borders that had not been closed in decades, causing the disruption
of cross-border social and economic bonds of many border communities. Sec-
ondly, there has been a strong emphasis on protecting the access routes to the
body, as demonstrated by the infinite loop of messages on television and in
public spaces that reminded the public to cover mouth and nose, and to sanitize
vehicles of germs that could bring the disease into the body. These strategies
also mirror the state of exception that underpins an extraordinary deployment
of power to protect the community.
In sum, this section examined how biopower has manifested itself through-
out history in the anti-epidemic response, arguing that these responses were
not entirely based on the nature or gravity of the epidemic. Rather, they were
following a certain agenda that benefitted one group of people at the expense
of a marginalized community. This remains true across the diverse paradigms
of epidemiological response highlighted above, such as segregation, segmenta-
tion, and immunity.
At the same time, the apparatus of security that has been developed in re-
sponse to diseases has become increasingly powerful, reaching the point ob-
served during the Covid-19 pandemic, in which both dimensions of ‘immunity’
(i.e. fear of contagion by foreigners and attention on geographical and physical
boundaries) and the system of security/surveillance havematerialized.We shall
now move to analyse how these theoretical tendencies have been embodied in
practical instances, focusing on two specific case studies.
3. Burakumin and the Othering of Impurity in Japan
In this section, we shall delineate how diseases and pandemics in Japan con-
tributed to the historical discrimination of the burakumin, a caste of ‘untouch-
ables’ relegated to performing ‘impure tasks’. Before proceeding, it is important
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to note that while scholarship became interested in the burakumin issue in the
1970s, on the wave of social upheavals, studies on this minority gradually faded
out, and at the moment of writing the scholarship on this subject is rather lim-
ited. The extensive research produced throughout the 1970s though, does offer
thorough information on the historical dimension of the burakumin, which is
the focus of this article.
Epidemic trends in Japan were historically different from the pandemic im-
pacts faced by Mediterranean and European areas. Japan was isolated fromma-
jor commercial routes until the 1850s, and therefore epidemics that had been
particularly deadly in Europe, such as the bubonic plague and typhus, did not
cause high rates of mortality in Japan until the arrival of Western ships. Small-
pox, measles, influenza, and diarrheal infections were the cause of severe epi-
demics but did not impact significantly on the mortality rate in Early Modern
Japan¹. However rare, epidemics did occur in pre-modern Japan. This section
analyses how the origins of the longest-standing minority in Japan, the buraku-
min, are intertwined with the history of disease, and the related history of pol-
lution. In particular, we shall examine how power was deployed as a response to
epidemics, and reinforced structures of power to the detriment of an oppressed
community. As noted in the theoretical framework above, Japan’s politicized
response has strong connections with an ideological framework provided by
religion: in this case, Shintoism and Buddhism.
The history of burakumin is long and complex, but many sources trace their
existence back to the 11ᵗʰ century. At this juncture, plagues were widespread
in the capital of Kyoto, and sudden death was a common occurrence, as floods,
earthquakes, and fires were usual events.² Until the Heian period (794-1185),
lowly status was not determined by contact with pollution. However, starting
from the 11ᵗʰ century, pollution, and specifically contact with death, came to
be a reason of social discrimination. Leprosy, in particular, was known as the
‘karmic retribution disease’ and it was believed to be a punishment for evil
¹The period from 1603 to 1867, coinciding with the Edo or Tokugawa period. On this topic, see
Ann Jannetta Epidemics and Mortality in Early Modern Japan (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1987), 15.
²Sarah Horton, “Mukaekō: Practice for the Deathbed”, in Death and the Afterlife in Japanese
Buddhism, ed. Jacqueline I. Stone andMariko NambaWalter (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press,
2009), 38.
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acts committed in the previous or present life.¹ Lepers were therefore soon cat-
egorized as hinin (non-people), in other periods also known as eta (meaning
‘defilement abundant’). However, as bearers of the physical manifestation of
sin, they were also considered capable of providing a possibility of salvation
to those who offered to help them (ibid.). As it is reported in a saiseki (diary
of a nobleman), as early as 1017 we can observe facilities called hiden-in that
were used to maintain lepers and other terminally ill patients. At this point in
Japanese history, leprosy was considered a divine punishment that was inflicted
upon people who had committed evil acts in the present or past life. Leprosy
was the most dreaded of all the diseases that were common in medieval Japan.
Similarly to what happened in Europe, lepers were abandoned by their fami-
lies and banished from the community. They took refuge in the hiden-in, which
were usually established near a river so that the water would cleanse the pol-
lution they were carrying around.² In the Early Modern period, leprosy contin-
ued to be understood as a disease linked to bad behavior, and lepers became the
objects of exclusionary practices: terrified of contagion, families forced lepers
out. Thus, they became itinerant beggars, and organised their own community
at the margin of society.³ When in 1907, the Diet passed a law that instituted
five leprosaria to host lepers who had been forced out by their families, they did
so by following a segregation logic according to which these institutions were
separated from the rest of the community by walls and gates. In two cases the
leprosaria were even built on small archipelagos.⁴ While at first confinement
was voluntary, since the 1930s it became mandatory.⁵ Thus, it is possible to see
how ‘power’ manifested itself through these measures, as the organisation and
sanitization of the community was based on the biopolitics of the exclusion of
the sick, that became a part of the more extended community of outcasts that
would have become known as burakumin.
¹Susan L. Burns, “Making Illness into Identity: Writing ‘Leprosy Literature’ in Modern Japan”,
Japan Review 16 (2004): 194.
²Keiji Nagahara, “The Medieval Origins of the Eta-Hinin”, The Journal of Japanese Studies 5
(1979): 387.
³Burns, “Making Illness into Identity”: 195.
⁴For the application of a similar strategy in Europe, see the analysis of the Venice lazarettos in
Section 4.
⁵Burns, “Making Illness into Identity”: 196.
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The marginalized status of the burakumin became increasingly institution-
alized with the establishment of social order typical of Tokugawa (1603-1867)
Japan, which was crystalized in a hereditary four-classes organisation that in-
cluded the samurai (warrior/rulers) at the top, and in descending order peas-
ants, artisans and merchants. Other groups of people lived outside this caste-
systems, such as the eta or kawata (hereditary pariahs) and those who were
excluded from the social organisation as a punishment (hinin).¹ In the Sengoku
period (the period of warring States between 1467 to 1615) feudal lords recruited
groups of pariahs to perform humble but necessary jobs in their castle cities, but
with the advent of the pax Tokugawa, these groups of outcasts were relocated to
margins of town and formed their own communities. However, periods of crop
failure and public hardship strained the relationship between commoners and
burakumin. In order to protect the interests and self-esteem of villagers, local
and national governments introduced new regulations that imposed symbols
of status distinction, which enforced separation of residence and function.²
In the Middle Ages, the formation of outcast groups was connected to the
othering of those who were excluded from the social order (beggars, prison-
ers, performers, lepers, eta…), and they were kept outside of the class system.
In this caste structure, the outcasts were considered as ‘subhuman’, in contrast
to the Imperial family, who were considered ‘superhuman’. Outcasts did not
take part in the basic relations of production. Furthermore, they were prevented
from being involved in property relations³. In particular, during the medieval
period jobs that were considered lowly and dirty (e.g. tanning, leatherwork,
itinerant singing, peddling, marine transportation, ditch and well digging, pub-
lic execution, cattle breeding) were assigned to the lower classes, known as
Senmin, who lived in the river banks or on barren land within the precincts of
manors, known as Sanjo (a name that burakumin neighbourhood retained until
recently). Beggars and other social outcasts gathered in these communities and
contributed to the historical development of the group known as burakumin.⁴
¹Conrad Totman, A History of Japan (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 281.
²Totman, A History of Japan, 283.
³Cf. Toshio Kuroda, Nihon Chusei no Kokka to Shukyo [State and Religion in Japan’s Middle
Ages] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1975), 380.
⁴Nobuo Shimahara, Burakumin: A Japanese Minority and Education (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971),
16-17.
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The development of these neighbourhoods can also be understood through the
‘immunity’ paradigm examined above, as the preventive confinement of im-
pure people would have prevented the infection of the community at large. The
outcast status of the burakumin was finally enshrined in law in the Tokugawa
period of 1603-1867. Although this was changed with the Emancipation Edict
of 1871, which compared them to other common citizens, the material life of
the burakumin community continued as before.¹
Burakumin communities were most prevalent in the Kinai area (which cor-
responds roughly to today’s region of Kansai), which included Kyoto, Osaka,
Nara, and Hyogo. This area was the centre of power of the Emperor, who es-
tablished his court in Nara and then in Kyoto during the medieval period. Be-
cause of the proximity to the centre of power, the social order and the status
ranking were more developed than in the peripheral areas of the State.² The
proximity to the physical and imagined centre of power corresponded there-
fore to an increased marginalization. In this sense, as we argued in Section 2,
power manifested itself in the very territory which it controlled. This manifes-
tation took place through the othering of the groups that were deemed to be
the bearer of infection, which were displaced outside the village and therefore
occupied a physical space removed from the organised reality of the commu-
nity. Moreover, in the case of the burakumin, power manifested most intensely
at the centre. Thus, the segmentation of the community and marginalization
of undesirables happened in a geographical space that increasingly faded as it
moved away from the centre.
As mentioned above, religion played a central role in this process of ‘oth-
ering’. Religious authorities often provided the ideological framework within
which the biopolitical power manifested itself. The case of the burakumin ver-
ifies this argument, as Buddhism and Shintoism directly contributed to the
widespread belief that outcasts in Japan were, to some extent, polluted. Around
the 8ᵗʰ century, the practices of Shintoism began emphasizing the necessity to
avoid contamination with the unclean: interacting with those performing oc-
cupations that dealt with illnesses, wounds, and death was therefore a sin of
uncleanliness. At the same juncture, Buddhism stressed that compassion had
¹Shimahara, Burakumin, 14.
²Nagahara, “The Medieval Origins of the Eta-Hinin”, 386.
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to be extended to all living beings and prohibited the slaughter and killing of
all animals. These two arguments “contributed to the development of the con-
cept of ‘untouchability’ and encouraged the relegation to outcast status of those
engaged in tasks dealing with blood, death, and dirt”.¹ Therefore, one of the ra-
tionales for the social exclusion of certain social groupswas rooted in the Shinto
notions of pollution as a product of association with death, birth, or blood, or
with crime or disease. In particular, diseases with a high coefficient of conta-
gion, such as leprosy, were understood to be the most dangerous.²
However, there is a part of scholarship that sees the discrimination of groups
such as the burakumin as being solely a product of social context. As Hatanaka
argues, “buraku discrimination is status discriminationwhichwas formedwithin
the social structure of themodem emperor system and systematically supported
and re-createdwithin it”.³Therefore, according to him, a group of people known
as burakumin have continued to exist in Japan (with different levels of social
exclusion) until the present day, but their belonging to the outcast class is but
a product of social context. There is no objective and observable criterion that
transcends social structure thatcharacterize burakumin, and thus the continuity
across the centuries of a buraku lineage is questionable. Given that according
to Hatanaka, discrimination is the effect of social context, and this has shifted
and changed many times, over time people could eventually move across the
boundaries of the groups that were identified as burakumin (or any other dis-
criminated group). In this sense, the politics of pandemics can be interpreted as
an instrument that supported the policy of othering to the detriment of certain
groups.
Moreover, the fact that this discrimination happened in a social system that
organized society in classes by birth supported the perpetuation of discrimi-
nation against burakumin. The people who constituted this minority were not
ejected from the community on an ethnic basis. Rather, their discrimination
was the result of a political intervention finalized at separating those who were
¹Shimahara, Burakumin, 18.
²Cf. Tetsuichi Niunoya, “Kebiishi: Chusei no kegare to kenryoku” [The Capital Police: Ritual
Pollution and Political Power in Medieval Japan] (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1986), 57-78.
³Toshiyuki Hatanaka, Burakushin no Owari [The End of Buraku History], 190 (Kyoto: Kamo-
gawa Shuppan, 1998), quoted in Ian Neary, “Burakumin at the End of History”, Social Research 70,
no. 1 (2003): 282.
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in some way in contact with impurity, in order to preserve the purity of the
community. According to Nagahara, the burakumin came to be discriminated
against because of “conscious political decisions reflecting social and religious
beliefs of the past”.¹ Since it is virtually impossible to distinguish a burakumin
(ethnically Japanese) from a commoner, their othering had to be sanctioned in
such away that theywould be immediately recognizable. Feudal rulers enforced
regulations which sanctioned that the burakumin must wear humble clothing
and attach a rectangular piece of cloth on it to furthermark their status. Further-
more, burakumin could not perform daily activities such as sitting and eating
in front of commoners.² Thus, the confinement of the burakumin group, which
had no other basis than an arbitrary line based on pre-existent categories of
discrimination, had to rely on visual signals to the population.
While it has notably declined, to some extent the discrimination of the bu-
raku minority continues to the present day, beyond the sanitary and religious
reasons linked to uncleanness that were the root of their social exclusion. As
argued above, the rituals of exclusion that determined the segregated life of out-
cast communities are found also in the reiterated experience of social rejection
of the buraku. To conclude, the issue of burakumin discrimination showcases
but one facet of the consolidation of statal power in Japan, but the persistence of
the issue and the way in which it power has continued to intervene throughout
modern Japanese history makes it particularly suitable to analyse these struc-
tures of power in Japan and political and societal responses to pandemics.
4. Pandemics in Europe at the Dawn of the Modern Era
In the previous section, we analysed how epidemics and disease played a
part in shaping the assertion of political authority in the case of medieval and
Early Modern Japan. In the present section, we shall instead focus on how Eu-
rope (and the Mediterranean basin) dealt with similar issues. We acknowledge
that the study of the two cases will present necessary distinctions, due to the
relative isolation of Japan from major trade routes. However, the similarities
¹Nagahara, “The Medieval Origins of the Eta-Hinin”, 386.
²Shimahara, Burakumin, 18.
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among these different cases are significant. They shall provide further evidence
of the political and social influence that structures of power have on determin-
ing societal responses to disease.
The onset of the plague epidemic in Europe is widely considered to be one of
the most significant events, shaping the context for the beginning of what we
consider the Early Modern age. A significant distinction can be made between
the short-term and the long-term effects of the pandemic. In the short term, the
plague ripped “tears in the fabric of society which undermined social discipline
and cohesiveness”, segmenting European civilization along the familiar lines
that divided “those in the cultural mainstream and those at its margins”.¹ In the
long term, the plague had amplified and indirect effects which threatened the
continuity of the traditional way of living constituting the very foundation of
Western civilization. In this section, we shall focus primarily on the short-term
effects, as they are more clearly analysable through the theoretical lens devel-
oped above, in Section 2. However, this should not be taken as an indication that
the long-term fallout of the plague was less politicized, or socially constructed.
For obvious historical reasons, nonetheless, it is more convenient to primarily
focus our analysis on a more homogenous setting. Such a setting is represented
by the intensely politicized response to the plague pandemic during the years
ranging from the middle of the 14ᵗʰ century to the beginning of the 17ᵗʰ.
The outbreak of Black Death on European soil in the 1350s is considered one
of the closing moments of the medieval era, since it represented an unprece-
dented upsetting of the cultural and traditional establishment.The elites leading
society were perceived by the population to have failed, given the disastrous
results of their administration.² Trust and obedience towards the authorities
plummeted, pointing at the lack of a centralized authority capable of justifying,
through the defence of commonwelfare, a stratification of society that certainly
distributed its privileges unequally.³
The Black Death of the 14ᵗʰ century was interpreted not only as a divine chas-
¹David Herlihy, The Black Death and the Transformation of the West, ed. Samuel Cohn Jr. (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1997), 59.
²Brian Pullan, “Plague and Perceptions of the Poor in Early-Modern Italy”, in Epidemics and
Ideas: Essays on the Historical Perception of Pestilence, ed. T. Ranger and P. Slack, 116 (Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1992).
³Herlihy, The Black Death and the Transformation of the West, 64.
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tise, but also as a social leveller. While the first wave of contagions impacted
more heavily on the lower social strata, the plague quickly overcame social and
biological barriers, beginning to hit people across “every condition, age, and
sex”.¹ However, there are significant differences in rates of mortality across
social groups. This circumstance can be explained by the availability, for richer
and nobler people, of the only possible remedy against the plague: flight. As tes-
tified by texts as early as Boccaccio’s Decameron, composed between 1349 and
1353, anyone with the means to escape the cities—epicentres of the outbreaks—
had an increased chance at survival.² Thus, despite the potentially cohesive ex-
perience of a shared risk at the hands of the pandemic, the social filter provided
by class and economic privilege nullified these unifying effects. The result is
the distrust towards socio-political authorities described above, in Section 2,
and the consequent attempt—by said authorities—to reinforce their position of
power through any means necessary.
While the traditional response against contagious diseases such as leprosy
was an established practice of social segregation, plague brought about a ver-
itable segmentation.³ The impact of the Black Death was the fragmentation of
society in a myriad of pieces, following blind attempts by the political author-
ities to respond to a new phenomenon, which the medical protocols of the age
did not anticipate, nor understand thoroughly.
The Hippocratic-Galenic medical standards of the medieval age did not pro-
vide helpful treatment against the plague, and where the self-government of
outdated medical guilds failed, the political authorities overstepped their tra-
ditional boundaries to create ‘public health boards’.⁴ The most avant-garde of
such institutions, the Venetian board of public health, established the first two
lazarettos (lazzaretti), i.e. specialized hospitals (respectively in 1423 and 1471),
¹Samuel Cohn Jr., The Black Death Transformed: Disease and Culture in Early Renaissance Europe
(London: Bloomsbury, 2003), 126.
²Samuel Cohn Jr., Cultures of Plague: Medical Thinking at the End of the Renaissance (Oxford:
Oxford UP, 2010), 210.
³Foucault, History of Madness, 52; cf. also Michael A. Peters and Tina A.C. Beasley, “Social Ex-
clusion/Inclusion: Foucault’s Analytics of Exclusion, the Political Ecology of Social Inclusion and
the Legitimation of Inclusive Education”, Open Review of Educational Research 1 (2014): 99-100.
⁴Carlo Cipolla, Public Health and the Medical Profession in the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge UP, 1976), 7.
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dedicated to plague patients and funded by the Republic. The board itself was
definitively established in 1489 and it would “only grow in power over the next
century, ultimately exerting control over parochial poor relief, suppression of
begging, and control of prostitution”.¹ Thus, the overstretched notion of ‘public
health’, which found justification in a state of exception such as the outbreak of
the plague, became an institutionalized and perennial intervention of the State
authority in medical and urban life.
Yet, we should not take the institution of public health as an orderly restora-
tion of civic authority. As Agamben argues, the response to emergency circum-
stances through an extension of power (a ‘state of exception’) institutionalizes
the crisis itself as a form of government, which can be defined anomia (i.e. ab-
sence of laws) despite the hypertrophic legalism it prima facie offers.² Thus,
institutions created in response to an emergency through the invocation of a
state of exception often incorporate and embody the ‘spirit’ of such emergency.
This is the case of the pogroms and the wave of antisemitism that followed
the Black Death in the middle of the 14ᵗʰ century. In 1348, a rumour was spread
that “the Jews of northern Spain and southern France were poisoning the Chris-
tian wells, and thus disseminating the plague”.³ In the general distrust that
surrounded established authorities such as emperors and kings, the frenzied
population did not even listen to the pontifex, Pope Clement VI, who officially
declared the accusation “unthinkable” in the papal bull Sicut Judæis.⁴ Instead,
inhabitants of several cities convinced the municipal authorities to interrogate,
torture, and—after their extracted “confession”—execute Jewish citizens in sev-
eral massacres dated between 1348 and 1349. The chronicles especially men-
tion Chinon, Chambéry, and Strasbourg as sites of the persecution; but sources
confirm that the pogroms spread throughout Europe, including Germany and
Poland.
While past scholars had argued that these massacres resulted from unspeci-
fied ‘economic tensions’ due to shortages connected to the plague, research has
¹David D’Andrea, Civic Christianity in Renaissance Italy: The Hospital of Treviso 1400-1530
(Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2007), 101.
²Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. K. Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2005), 65-73.
³Herlihy, Black Death, 65.
⁴Cf. Herlihy, Black Death, 65; see also Snowden, Epidemics and Society, 65.
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lately shown how they more likely were “the result of social elites in shock due
to the extent of the natural disaster that had befallen them”.¹ In this example,
we can observe once more the segmentation resulting from the establishment
of a state of exception, justified by the pandemic-generated anomia. The sudden
lack of trust towards established authorities (pope, king, emperor) caused a seg-
mentation of society, which turned to local institutions and invested them with
exceptional powers in order to react to the situation.² Such local authorities,
selected through social elitism, played their role, identifying in the most proxi-
mate minority the scapegoat to justify their power, ultimately reproducing the
anomia that had brought them to exercise their potestas.
If the pogroms of the mid-14ᵗʰ century represented the sudden overturning of
the established medieval downwards structure of power—from top to bottom,
from God to pope, from emperor to vassal—the Italian committees of the 15ᵗʰ
and 16ᵗʰ century, instead, “constituted the first form of institutionalized public
health”.³ The main difference between the former and the latter examples is the
exceptionality of the situation. While in the 14ᵗʰ century plague struck as an
unprecedented disaster which caught authorities unprepared, the 15ᵗʰ and 16ᵗʰ
century outbreaks were met with a conscious, if still anomic, utilization of the
powers granted by the epidemiological permanent state of exception. When
“a city besieged by a major plague epidemic became a perfect dystopia” and
“bonds of community and family ties were severed”, authorities tapped at their
new array of draconian measures, martial law, and miscellaneous prohibitions
and obligations.⁴
¹Justin Stearns, “New Directions”, 1367; cf. also Samuel Cohn Jr., “The Black Death and the
Burning of the Jews”, Past and Present 196 (2007): 11.
²Agamben, State of Exception, 79.
³Snowden, Epidemics and Society, 69.
⁴Snowden, 78.
Discrimination, Othering, and the Political Instrumentalizing of Pandemic Disease 3 : 21
The medical profession, too, reproduced the prejudicial instinct towards the
segmentation of society. In the late 16ᵗʰ century, the Roman plague doctor Fran-
cesco Tommasi identified the pestilence as peculiar of “the filthy plebs and those
who were dirty, such as Jews, butchers, cooks, tailors, and then the greedy and
unclean and disorderly types, gluttons and libidinous men, whose activities
gave rise to putrefied blood”.¹ Clearly, the separation between pure and im-
pure, healthy and unhealthy, is drawn along lines of discrimination remarking
pre-existent racial, occupational, socio-religious, and economical prejudices.
The differentiation among the aforementioned categories of ‘impure’ people
became less and less meaningful as plague settled in Early Modern Europe as a
recurring pandemic; “poor” became the general term to describe the most vul-
nerable groups. The association between vulnerability to the plague and ‘poor-
ness’ was definitely established in the 15ᵗʰ century “on the basis of the nature
of the bodies of the poor, their actions and environments”.² The essentialist na-
ture of this association meant that rich and poor (aliases for pure and impure,
healthy and unhealthy) were treated differently in the face of a disease that,
as we noted earlier, was initially perceived as a leveller, impacting population
across traditional boundaries.³ As the plague became more endemic, the preju-
dicial lines separating healthy and unhealthy also remarked the all-too-familiar
discrimination of gender. Women were perceived as biologically more inclined
to become infected, and to die at the hands of the plague; such biased distinc-
tion is “unlikely to have been caused by biological differences but instead by the
greater number of women living in difficult and poor conditions”.⁴ This preju-
diced conception became so entrenched that plague ended up being described,
in the iconography of the 17ᵗʰ century, as an old and poor woman.⁵
So far, in this section we have highlighted how practices of public health
brought about configurations of segregation and segmentation in EarlyModern
¹Francesco Tommasi, Tractatus de Peste (Roma: Torneri and Donangeli, 1587), 14. For a similar
description in the 17ᵗʰ century, cf. Girolamo Gastaldi, Tractatus de avertenda et profliganda peste
politico-legalis (Bologna: Manolessi, 1684), 344.
²Jane Stevens Crawshaw, Plague Hospitals: Public Health for the City in Early Modern Venice
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 99.
³Cf. D’Andrea, Civic Christianity in Renaissance Italy, 105.
⁴Stevens Crawshaw, Plague Hospitals, 104.
⁵Cesare Ripa, Iconologia (Padova: Pietro Paolo Tozzi, 1611), 421-422.
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European society. The creation of lazzaretti, however, can also be interpreted as
a practice aimed at building immunity for the city and the community. In fact,
the ‘preventive’ logic of immunity, was deployed through the proactive seclu-
sion of community members considered at risk.¹ The aim was a comparative
security for those who had not been infected—according to the subjective judg-
ment of the pizzigamorti (body clearers and coroners), known for being subject
to corruption and abuse of power.² The expendability of ‘poor’ lives in order to
maintain the immunity of the community as a whole became more established
in the 17ᵗʰ century, when the appearance of plague as a social leveller had en-
tirely faded.³ Thus, the inoculation in the body of the city of the lazzaretti as
a controlled site of infection was considered an acceptable measure to manage
public health, building immunity for the community as a whole, while treating
“poor” workers employed to maintain the hospitals as expendable.
In sum, in this section we have demonstrated how Early Modern responses
to the plague—whether they adapted a paradigm of segregation, segmentation,
or immunity—were highly politicized. As we have seen, these reactions cannot
be taken as a mere fact of history, since it would be wrong to affirm that they
were ‘just’ medical responses to a sanitary crisis. With Foucault, it may be ar-
gued that they created the very idea of ‘public health’ as a biopolitical vehicle
to establish control over the population. While the exaggeration of this claim
is certainly wrong, the historical fact remains that emergencies throughout the
dawn of the Early Modern era were appropriated by structures of power to gen-
erate a certain kind of centralized power, which acted in dialectical ways to sep-
arate the healthy from the unhealthy, the pure from the impure. This dialectic
effectively created a permanent ‘state of alert’ which paralleled “the anticipa-
tory preparedness of the living system for an encounter with potentially lethal
powers of irritation and invasion”—the other, the infected, shortly became an
enemy.⁴
The justification of discriminatory practices through the acknowledgement
of a sanitary emergency such as the plague corrupted the concept of public
¹Esposito, Immunitas, 8.
²Cf. Jane Stevens Crawshaw, “The Beasts of Burial: pizzigamorti and Public Health for the Plague
in Early Modern Venice”, Social History of Medicine 24 (2011): 570-587.
³Stevens Crawshaw, Plague Hospitals, 134.
⁴Sloterdijk, You Must Change Your Life, 8.
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health, subjecting it to the logics of anomia, born from a state of emergency.
Thus, the overarching political responses to plague were in principle polluted by
the circumstances andmindset that originated them. As a result, we have shown
that those historical reconstructions, which aim at justifying the Early Mod-
ern conception of public health as an appropriate—if ill-informed—response to
extraordinary epidemiological events, fail to take into account the transitive
property of exceptionality. In other words, by establishing a political paradigm
through appeals to a state of exception, Early Modern public health inherited
the exceptionality and anomic nature of the crisis itself, reproducing its inequal-
ities and discriminatory practices.
5. Conclusions
In the theoretic section of this paper, we formulated the hypothesis that polit-
ical and societal responses to major disease outbreaks (epidemics or pandemics)
are often biased and dictated by pre-existing structures of power. Through this
lens, ‘public health’ has been shown as a heavily charged term, often employed
to re-establish biopolitical structures. The latter, threatened by the social up-
rising and consciousness of inequality caused by fast-spreading diseases, have
sought to reaffirm their stability through practices of control, isolation, social
segregation, and segmentation.
From the analyses developed in the subsequent sections, it emerged that in
Japan as in Europe, the turn from the medieval age to the Early Modern State
signified a more unified political authority, which assumed the role of ‘pro-
tector’ through the establishment of permanent public health institutions and
political devices. The ultimate goal of these latter institutions was the creation
of an imagined ‘immunity’ for the community subject to these biopolitical au-
thorities. However, the criteria for selecting who had to be protected and made
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‘immune’ were highly politicized, and were formulated according to caste, sex,
ethnicity, or social class prejudices.
In conclusion, we have shown how the development of public health as a
concept, stemming from a ‘state of exception’ creates the ground for biopolitical
oppression, which could perhaps be termed a ‘State of exception’. For this rea-
son, even in 21ˢᵗ century responses to pandemic diseases such as Covid-19, there
appears to be cause of alarm. There is, however, a significant difference in the
structures of power that oversee the anti-pandemic measures today: as it was
argued above, in the Early Modern period, State authorities had a shaky basis,
and used anti-disease measures as one of the means to assert their power and
reinforce discriminatory structures that favoured the elites. In the 21ˢᵗ century,
instead, States are firmly grounded in social, political, and economic conven-
tions and do not have a need to corroborate their power. Authority is already
established and increasingly pervasive, and the advent of neoliberal structures
of power determined a significant shift in the structures of power, which are
increasingly intertwined to the economic fate of the state. This has been par-
ticularly evident in the unwillingness and tardiness of conservative populist
governments—such as those led by Donald Trump and Boris Johnson—to im-
plement lockdowns for the fear of economic repercussions.
However, due to the social effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, ‘othering’ ten-
dencies manifested against communities that had already been heavily affected
by the economic crisis that hit most of Western countries in 2008 and by a
welfare system impoverished by neoliberal policies. Amongst the many exam-
ples that can be given to this regard, the mortality rate amongst black com-
munities in the United States is one of the most prominent. The rate at which
Black Americans are infected by, and die because of Covid-19 infections are
higher than other racial groups in the US. Pre-existing health conditions have
surely played a part in the higher mortality rates. However, they are also the
product of a systemic discrimination that has everyday detrimental impact on
black population.¹ One of the secondary effects of the pandemic is the economic
downturn that has already started to affect all major global economies. Those
who were already suffering from disadvantaged positions and discriminations
on the job market are more severely impacted by the consequences of the pan-
¹Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, “The Black Plague”, The New Yorker April 24, 2020.
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demic. For instance, studies show how the Covid-19 pandemic is having harsh
consequences on gender equality: women’s income and employment opportu-
nity are likely to be more heavily affected than men’s.¹ Similarly, individuals
born or resident in disadvantaged countries are affected by discrimination and
prejudice.The regular immigration fluxes have been halted. Undocumented mi-
gration has become even riskier for the desperate individuals who are forced to
face the perils of being impounded in immigration detention centres. Insofar as
they are hosted in structures that do not comply with safety and hygiene stan-
dards, migrants are exposed to high risks of contagion, as testified by theHuman
Rights Watch advocacy group.² Higher contagions in detention centres, in turn,
help xenophobic groups to further the ‘stranger danger’ rhetoric and discrim-
inate against refugees, propagating the fallible ‘immunity’ paradigm analysed
above.³
While health services have notably expanded and improved since medieval
Japan and Early Modern Europe, the social inequalities that are becoming in-
creasingly intrinsic within neoliberal democracies exacerbate discrimination
against certain communities. It is certainly true that the evolution of the neolib-
eral State determined that structures of power are nowmore concernedwith the
flux of capitals and goods rather than the direct control and restriction of citi-
zens. However, this might be interpreted as a mutation in the manner of power
reproduction rather than a radical reshaping of political ideas. In conclusion,
the possibility of furthering structures of oppression behind the appearance of
public health concerns, as we have shown in this paper, is a historical constant
and an ongoing preoccupying trend.
¹Tali Kristal and Meir Yaish, “Does the Coronavirus Pandemic Level the Gender Inequality
Curve? (It Doesn’t)”, Research on Social Stratification and Mobility 68 (2020): 1-5.
²Human Rights Watch, “Europe: Curb Immigration Detention Amid Pandemic” April 27, 2020.
³Imran Khan, “Are EU countries using COVID-19 to clamp down on refugees?”, Al Jazeera News
August 24, 2020.
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